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Abstract
Background: Most economic theories are based on the premise that individuals maximize their own self-interest and
correctly incorporate the structure of their environment into all decisions, thanks to human intelligence. The influence of
this paradigm goes far beyond academia–it underlies current macroeconomic and monetary policies, and is also an integral
part of existing financial regulations. However, there is mounting empirical and experimental evidence, including the recent
financial crisis, suggesting that humans do not always behave rationally, but often make seemingly random and suboptimal
decisions.
Methods and Findings: Here we propose to reconcile these contradictory perspectives by developing a simple binary-
choice model that takes evolutionary consequences of decisions into account as well as the role of intelligence, which we
define as any ability of an individual to increase its genetic success. If no intelligence is present, our model produces results
consistent with prior literature and shows that risks that are independent across individuals in a generation generally lead to
risk-neutral behaviors, but that risks that are correlated across a generation can lead to behaviors such as risk aversion, loss
aversion, probability matching, and randomization. When intelligence is present the nature of risk also matters, and we
show that even when risks are independent, either risk-neutral behavior or probability matching will occur depending upon
the cost of intelligence in terms of reproductive success. In the case of correlated risks, we derive an implicit formula that
shows how intelligence can emerge via selection, why it may be bounded, and how such bounds typically imply the
coexistence of multiple levels and types of intelligence as a reflection of varying environmental conditions.
Conclusions: Rational economic behavior in which individuals maximize their own self interest is only one of many possible
types of behavior that arise from natural selection. The key to understanding which types of behavior are more likely to
survive is how behavior affects reproductive success in a given population’s environment. From this perspective,
intelligence is naturally defined as behavior that increases the probability of reproductive success, and bounds on rationality
are determined by physiological and environmental constraints.
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Introduction
Most economic theories assume that individuals behave
rationally, maximizing their own self-interest subject to resources
constraints. This framework has led to numerous breakthroughs in
economic science, including expected utility theory [1] (an
axiomatic formulation of rational behavior under uncertainty),
the notion of ‘‘rational expectations’’ [2] (individual expectations
are formed to be mutually consistent with those arising from
economic equilibria), and the ‘‘efficient markets hypothesis’’ [3,4]
(market prices fully reflect all available information). While other
alternatives have been proposed, such as heuristic approximation
(‘‘satisficing’’) and bounded rationality [5], the vast majority of
current economic models still assume the ideal of a fully rational
and optimizing individual, often referred to as Homo economicus.
The influence of this paradigm goes far beyond academia–it
underlies current macroeconomic and monetary policies, and has
also become an integral part of the rules and regulations that
govern financial markets today [6,7].
However, there is mounting empirical and experimental
evidence, including the recent financial crisis, suggesting that
humans do not always behave rationally, but often make
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seemingly random and suboptimal decisions [8]. These behavioral
anomalies are especially pronounced when elements of risk and
probability are involved, and two of the most well-known are
probability matching [9,10] (the tendency to choose randomly
between heads and tails when asked to guess the outcomes of a
series of independent biased-coin tosses, where the randomization
matches the probability of the biased coin), and loss aversion [11]
(the tendency to take greater risk when choosing between two
potential losses, and less risk when choosing between two potential
gains). Both behaviors are clearly suboptimal from the individual’s
perspective, yet they have been observed in thousands of
geographically diverse human subjects over several decades. Such
anomalous behaviors have also been observed in many non-
human subjects including ants [12–15], bees [16–18], fish [19,20],
pigeons [21,22], and primates [23], which suggests that they may
have a common and ancient origin, and an evolutionary role that
belies their apparent shortcomings.
Accordingly, several evolutionary models have been proposed to
explain these counterintuitive behaviors [24–26], as well as a
variety of other social customs including altruism, cooperation,
subterfuge, self-deception, kin selection, and reciprocity [27–31].
The fields of sociobiology and, more recently, evolutionary
psychology have expanded the reach of evolution to even broader
domains such as language, culture, and religion [29,32–35].
However, it is unclear how these behaviors relate to standard
economic theories of individual rationality, why they emerge in
some instances and not others, and what part intelligence plays in
such behaviors.
The economics literature has also considered evolutionary
arguments, primarily through the natural selection of utility
functions that individuals maximize [36–47]. In financial-market
contexts, the evolution of trading strategies [48–57] and supply/
demand functions [58–60] have also been considered. However,
the starting point for these models is considerably more
sophisticated behavior than what we propose in our framework.
In particular, utility maximization, the existence of excess demand
functions, or specific trading strategies already assume a certain
degree of goal-seeking behavior and intelligence, which are traits
we derive in a much simpler, less structured binary choice model
[26]. From purely mindless acts of choosing between two
alternatives, we show that natural selection alone is capable of
generating very specific behavioral patterns such as risk aversion,
loss aversion, and mixed strategies. More importantly, with this
primitive framework, we are able to derive the beginnings of what
can plausibly be construed as intelligent behavior and how such
intelligence is naturally bounded by environmental and physio-
logical constraints.
The key feature is the interaction between individual behavior
and the stochastic environment in which reproductive success is
determined, and the difference between idiosyncratic and system-
atic risk is of central importance as documented in many earlier
studies [24,26,38,40,46]. If all individuals behave identically and
deterministically, choosing the course of action that leads to the
highest expected number of offspring, this can lead to extinction if
reproductive uncertainty is perfectly correlated across individuals
in a given generation, i.e., if all individuals occupy the same
ecological niche. For example, if all individuals choose to forage in
the same higher-yielding patch, the first time that patch becomes
barren, the entire population will be wiped out. In such
environments, randomizing behavior such as Herrnstein’s Law
[10] may be favored by natural selection over any type of
deterministic behavior. What we observe as irrational behavior
may indeed be irrational from the individual’s perspective, but not
from the population’s perspective and it is the latter that is the
outcome of natural selection. However, if reproductive success is
statistically independent across individuals in a given generation–
corresponding to situations in which each individual occupies its
own unique niche–we show that natural selection favors individ-
ually optimal deterministic behavior instead.
Such a framework provides a natural definition of ‘‘intelli-
gence’’: any behavior that is positively correlated with reproduc-
tive success. If achieving such correlation imposes biological costs
on an individual–for example, because it requires attention,
memory, planning, and other cognitive faculties–these costs imply
an upper bound on the degree of intelligence that emerges through
selection. This yields an evolutionary foundation for ‘‘bounded
rationality’’ [5]–a heuristics-based model of behavior–as well as a
reconciliation between rational economic models and their
behavioral violations. Seemingly irrational behavior may be
irrational from the individual’s perspective but not necessarily
from the population perspective.
Model
Consider a population in which each individual (not necessarily
human) in a given generation t is faced with a single decision in its
lifetime, to choose action a or b, and this choice implies a certain
number of offspring xat or xbt, respectively, where xat and xbt are
random variables with joint distribution function W(xat,xbt). Let
individual i’s behavior be represented by a binary variable Iit
which equals 1 if a is chosen and 0 if b is chosen. Suppose that i
chooses a with probability f and chooses b with probability 1{f
where the probability f is any value between 0 and 1, including
the two endpoints (thus capturing purely deterministic behavior as
well). Then i’s behavior is given by the following Bernoulli random
variable I
f
it :
I
f
it ~
1 with probabilityf
0 with probability1{f

: ð1Þ
The parameter f represents the behavioral ‘‘phenotype’’ of an
individual, and we assume that this behavior is completely
‘‘mindless’’ in the sense that the individual’s decision I
f
it is
statistically independent of any other variables in its environment,
including the behaviors of others and the outcomes (xat,xbt). The
assumption of independence also implies the absence of any
strategic interactions between individuals, since i’s choice has no
impact on j’s reproductive outcomes.
If we assume that the offspring of type-f individuals are also of
the same type, and we start with an equal number of all types of
individuals in the population, we can explore the evolution of
behavior by identifying the value of f that exhibits the highest
geometric growth rate (or ‘‘fitness’’), which we denote by f . Over
time, f  individuals will dominate the population at an exponen-
tially fast rate, hence the behavior f  will have ‘‘emerged’’ through
the forces of natural selection. We call f  the ‘‘growth-optimal’’
behavior to emphasize this fact.
The particular value of f  depends critically on the properties of
W(xat,xbt), which is a highly compact representation of the
biological features of the individual, its random environmental
circumstances, and the uncertain impact of behavior on fecundity.
Although such a model of evolution, in which individuals live for
one period and engage in asexual reproduction with no mutation,
is clearly stylized, it does capture the essence of how natural
selection shapes behavior. Extensions to biologically more realistic
features such as imperfect hereditary transmission of f , sexual
reproduction, and multiple rounds of offspring within a single
Bounded Rationality and Intelligence
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lifetime can easily be accommodated via constraints on W and
more sophisticated relationships between the f of an offspring and
its parents, but at the expense of analytical tractability and
transparency.
Evolutionary Origin of Behavior
Despite the simplicity of this framework, its behavioral
implications are surprisingly rich. Suppose we assume that:
(A) (xat,xbt) is independently and identically distributed (IID)
from one generation to the next, identically distributed across
individuals i within a given generation t, and independent of all
other random variables including I
f
it for all f and i.
This assumption allows us to derive a simple expression for the
population of type-f individuals in any given generation. If nt(f ) is
the number of individuals of type f in the population in generation
t, then we have the following recursive expression that captures
population growth:
nt(f )~
Xnt{1(f )
i~1
½Ifitxatz(1{I fit)xbt ð2Þ
where i indexes all individuals of type f in the previous generation
t{1.
The assumption that W(xat,xbt) is identically distributed across
all individuals within a given generation implies that these
individuals are part of the same ecological niche and will produce
the same number of random offspring xjt if they choose action j,
j~a,b. This assumption is implicitly reflected in the fact that xat
and xbt do not require subscript i’s because they are identical
across all individuals i in any generation t. Therefore, (2) may be
written as:
nt(f )~xat
Xnt{1(f )
i~1
I
f
it z xbt
Xnt{1(f )
i~1
(1{I
f
it) ð3Þ
and the Law of Large Numbers implies that the geometric growth
rate of each subpopulation of type f converges in probability to the
following limit (see Text S1):
plim
t??
log nt(f )=t : a(f ) ~ E½log (fxaz(1{f )xb) ð4Þ
where ‘‘plimt??’’ denotes convergence in probability and we
have omitted the t subscript without loss of generality because
(xat,xbt) are IID across generations.
By maximizing the growth rate a(f ) with respect to f , we can
determine the behavior f  that emerges through natural selection.
The maximum is given by:
f ~
1 if E½xa=xbw1 and E½xb=xav1
solution to (6) if E½xa=xb§1 and E½xb=xa§1
0 if E½xa=xbv1 and E½xb=xaw1
0
B@ ð5Þ
where f  is defined implicitly in the second case of (5) by:
0 ~ E
xa{xb
f xaz(1{f )xb
 
ð6Þ
and the expectations in (5) and (6) are with respect to the joint
distribution W(xa,xb).
The solution has three parts. We find that f ~1 if
E½xa=xbw 1 and E½xb=xav 1, where these inequalities imply
that the reproductive yield of a is unambiguously higher than that
of b. Conversely, f ~0 if both inequalities are reversed, in which
case the reproductive yield of a is unambiguously lower than that
of b. However, if E½xa=xb§ 1 and E½xb=xa§ 1, then f  is
strictly greater than 0 and less than 1, and is given by the value
that satisfies the equality (6). In this case, because the reproductive
yield of a neither dominates nor is dominated by that of b, the
behavior that yields the fastest growth rate involves randomizing
between the two choices with probability f , where f  is the value
that equates the expected ratio of the number of offspring from
each choice to the average number of offspring across the two
choices.
This result is surprising to economists because it seems
inconsistent with the maximization of self-interest, as well as the
deterministic behavior implied by expected utility theory [1].
Suppose E½xawE½xb and Var½xa~Var½xb so that action a
leads to a larger number of offspring on average for the same level
of risk; from an individual’s perspective, the ‘‘rational’’ action
would be to always select a, f~1. However, such individually
rational behavior will eventually be dominated by the faster-
growing f -types, hence it cannot persist over time. The growth-
optimal behavior f  may be viewed as a primitive version of
‘‘altruism’’, i.e., behavior that is suboptimal for the individual but
which promotes the survival of the population.
A Simulation Experiment
The emergence of behavior is most easily seen through a simple
simulation of the binary-choice model in a specific context where
probability-matching behavior arises. Consider an environment in
which it is sunny and rainy with probability p~75% and
1{p~25%, respectively. Individuals must decide where to build
their nests, in the valley (choice a) or on a plateau (choice b).
During sunny days, nesting on a plateau will yield E½xa~0
offspring because of the heat of the sun and lack of water, whereas
nesting in the valley yields E½xb~3 offspring because of the
valley’s shade and the streams that run through it. During rainy
days, the exact opposite outcomes are realized: nesting in the
valley yields E½xb~0 because the valley will flood, drowning all
offspring, but nesting on a plateau yields E½xa~3 because the rain
clouds provide both water and protection from the sun. In this
environment, the behavior that maximizes the survival probability
of an individual’s offspring is to choose a all the time (f~1) since
the probability of sunshine is 75%. However, such behavior
cannot survive–the first time it rains, all individuals of type f~1
will be eliminated from the population. In fact, the behavior
yielding the highest growth rate is f ~0:75; hence, ‘‘probability
matching’’ behavior, also known as ‘‘Herrnstein’s Law’’,
[10,24,26] is evolutionarily dominant in this special case.
For other values of the outcomes of E½xa and E½xb, f~p may
not yield the highest rate of growth, but f  can nevertheless be
strictly greater than 0 and less than 1, so that randomizing
behavior will still persist. When faced with environmental
randomness that affects the entire population in the same manner
(recall our ‘‘single-niche’’ assumption), and where the type of
randomness yields extreme outcomes for different behaviors,
deterministic behavior cannot survive because at some point, an
extreme outcome will occur, wiping out that subpopulation. The
only way to survive is to randomize, and the subpopulation that
grows fastest in this type of environment is one in which f ~p.
For concreteness, Table 1 contains a numerical simulation of this
example.
Bounded Rationality and Intelligence
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This simple example can be easily generalized to any arbitrary
number of offspring for both choices [26]:
Prob(xa~ca1,xb~cb1) ~ p [ ½0,1
Prob(xa~ca2,xb~cb2) ~ 1{p : q
ð7Þ
where we assume that cij§0 and cajzcbj=0, i~a,b and j~1,2.
The condition cajzcbj=0 rules out the case where both caj and
cbj are 0, in which case the binary choice problem becomes
degenerate because both actions lead to extinction hence the only
choice that has any impact on fecundity is in the non-extinction
state, and the only behavior that is sustainable is to select the
action with the higher number of offspring.
The growth-optimal behavior in this case will depend on the
relation between the probability p and the relative-fecundity
variables rj:caj=cbj for each of the two possible states of the world
j~1,2. Applying (5) under the distribution (7) for W yields the
following growth-optimal behavior f :
f ~
1 if r2[½qz pq
r1{p
,?) and r1wp
p
1{r2
z
q
1{r1
if
r2[(
1
q
{
p
q
r1 ,qz
pq
r1{p
) and r1wp ,
or
r2[(
1
q
{
p
q
r1 ,?) and r1ƒp
0
BBBB@
0 if r2[½0, 1
q
{
p
q
r1 
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
ð8Þ
Since cij may be 0, the ratios rj may be infinite if a finite
numerator is divided by 0, which poses no issues for any of the
results in this paper as long as the usual conventions involving
infinity are followed. The ambiguous case of rj~0=0 is ruled out
by the condition cajzcbj=0.
Figure 1 illustrates the values of r1 and r2 that yield each of the
three types of behaviors in (8). When r1 and r2 satisfy the
condition:
0 ~ p
r2
1{r2
z q
1
1{r1
, ð9Þ
exact probability matching behavior arises, and the solid black
curve in Figure 1 illustrates the locus of values for which this
condition holds. The horizontal asymptote of the curve occurs at
r2~0, so as r2 tends toward zero and r1 becomes relatively large,
exact probability matching will be optimal (note that the
asymmetry between r1 and r2 is due entirely to our requirement
that f ~p and p=
1
2
). However, values of (r1,r2) off this curve
but still within the shaded region imply random behavior that is
approximately–but not exactly–probability matching [26], pro-
viding a potential explanation for more complex but non-
deterministic foraging patterns observed in various species [12–
14,17,18].
Idiosyncratic Reproductive Risk
Now suppose we change our assumption that individuals all
belong to the same ecological niche, and assume instead that:
(B) (xat,xbt) is IID across individuals in each generation, as well
as from one generation to the next, and independent of all other
random variables including I
f
it for all f and i.
This corresponds to the situation in which each individual
occupies its own unique niche, receiving a separate and
independent random draw xiat or xibt from the same respective
distributions as others. In this case, the Law of Large Numbers
applies across individuals within each generation as well as over
time, and the growth rate of type-f individuals is given by:
a(f ) ~ log (f maz(1{f )mb) ð10Þ
where mj:E½xj , j~a,b. This function contains no random
variables and attains its maximum at f ~0 or1, depending on
whether mavmb or mawmb, respectively. Because individuals
within any given generation are already well diversified across
statistically independent niches, they can all engage in identical
behavior–individually optimal behavior–without the risk of
extinction.
When Nature yields systematic environmental shocks to an
entire population’s reproductive success, the population must
engage in random behavior to ensure that some of its members
will survive. However, when Nature imposes idiosyncratic shocks
Table 1. Simulated population sizes for binary-choice model
with five subpopulations in which individuals choose a with
probability f and b with probability 1{f , where
f~0:20,0:5,0:75,0:9,1, and the initial population is 10 for each
f .
Generation f = .20 f = .50 f* = .75 f = .90 f = 1
1 21 6 12 24 30
2 12 6 6 57 90
3 6 12 12 144 270
4 18 9 24 387 810
5 45 18 48 1,020 2,430
6 96 21 108 2,766 7,290
7 60 42 240 834 21,870
8 45 54 528 2,292 65,610
9 18 87 1,233 690 196,830
10 9 138 2,712 204 590,490
11 12 204 6,123 555 1,771,470
12 36 294 13,824 159 5,314,410
13 87 462 31,149 435 15,943,230
14 42 768 69,954 1,155 0
15 27 1,161 157,122 3,114 0
16 15 1,668 353,712 8,448 0
17 3 2,451 795,171 22,860 0
18 3 3,648 1,787,613 61,734 0
19 9 5,469 4,020,045 166,878 0
20 21 8,022 9,047,583 450,672 0
21 6 12,213 6,786,657 1,215,723 0
22 0 18,306 15,272,328 366,051 0
23 0 27,429 34,366,023 987,813 0
24 0 41,019 77,323,623 2,667,984 0
25 0 61,131 173,996,290 7,203,495 0
Reproductive uncertainty is systematic and also binary, with
Prob(ma~3,mb~0)~0:75 and Prob(ma~0,mb~3)~0:25. In this setting,
probability matching f ~0:75 is the growth-optimal behavior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050310.t001
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across the population, deterministic behavior can persist because
the chances of all individuals experiencing bad draws becomes
infinitesimally small as the population size grows. This distinction
between systematic and idiosyncratic environments is the key to
reconciling seemingly irrational behavior with Homo economicus: the
former emerges from systematic environments, and the latter from
idiosyncratic ones. Apparently, ‘‘Nature abhors an undiversified
bet’’, hence the type of environmental risk to fecundity determines
the type of behavior that has greatest fitness. This observation has
profound consequences for behavior, including a natural definition
of intelligent behavior and bounded rationality.
Results
Using the binary-choice framework, natural definitions of
intelligence and bounded rationality follow directly. Recall that
the individuals in our model are mindless in the sense that their
behaviors are assumed to be statistically independent of all other
variables. Suppose we relax this assumption by allowing individual
decisions to be correlated with other variables such as xa and xb:
(C) Let I
f
it be correlated with xiat and xibt, and define
r:Corr½I fit ,(xiat{xibt) which is assumed to be fixed over
generations t.
Correlation between actions and reproductive success is the
essence of what we mean by ‘‘intelligent behavior.’’
Intelligence: An Evolutionary Definition
As before, consider an initial population with equal numbers of
individuals of all types f , and with arbitrary correlations between
I
f
it and xiat and xibt so that no single value is over-represented.
Applying the Law of Large Numbers, we see that the growth rate
for individuals of type f with correlations.
a(f ,r)~ log (f maz(1{f )mbzrs
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f (1{f )
p
) ð11Þ
where s is the standard deviation of xa{xb. In this case, the
growth rate is equal to the growth rate of the mindless population
plus an extra term rs
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f (1{f )
p
that reflects the impact of
correlation between an individual’s decision and the number of
offspring. Several implications follow immediately from this
expression.
First, subpopulations with negative correlation between behav-
ior and xa{xb clearly cannot survive in the long run; their growth
rates are less than the no-correlation case, and correspond to
counter-productive behavior in which decisions coincide with
lower-than-average reproductive outcomes more often than not,
i.e., choosing a when xa{xb is lower than average and choosing b
when the reverse is true. By the same logic, subpopulations with
positive correlation will grow faster, and individuals with the
highest correlations r will dominate the population. We suggest
that these cases may be considered primitive forms of ‘‘intelli-
gence’’–behavior that yields improved fitness.
The subpopulation with the largest r will grow fastest and come
to dominate the population. For example, certain senses such as
hearing and eyesight are so highly correlated with reproductive
success that they become universally represented in the popula-
tion. By optimizing a(f ,r) with respect to f and r to yield f  and
r, we arrive at the growth-optimal level of intelligence and
behavior that emerges from the population (see Text S1):
Figure 1. Regions of the (r1,r2)-plane that imply deterministic (f
~0 or 1) or randomizing (0vf v1) behavior, where rj~caj=cbj
measures the relative fecundities of action a to action b in the two states j~1,2. The asymptotes of the curved boundary line occur at r1~p
and r2~q. Values of r1 and r2 for which exact probability matching is optimal is given by the solid black curve.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050310.g001
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r ~ 1, f  ~ Prob(xawxb) : ð12Þ
Perfect positive correlation always dominates imperfect correla-
tion, and despite the presence of idiosyncratic reproductive risk,
the growth-optimal behavior involves probability matching, albeit
a different kind in which f  matches the probability of xa
exceeding xb.
Bounded Rationality
If there is no biological cost to attaining r~1, then perfect
correlation will quickly take over the entire population, and
because we have assumed no mutation from one generation to the
next, all individuals will eventually possess this trait. However, it
seems plausible that positive correlation would be associated with
positive cost. For example, by using certain defense mechanisms
such as chemical repellants or physical force, animals can fend off
predators. This behavior increases their expected number of
offspring, but the physiological cost of defense may decrease this
expectation, hence the evolutionary success of such behavior
depends on the net impact to fitness. If we define a cost function
c(r), then we can express the ‘‘net’’ impact of correlation by
deducting this cost from the correlation itself to yield the following
asymptotic growth rate of type-f individuals:
a(f ,r)~ log (f maz(1{f )mbz½r{c(r)s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f (1{f )
p
) : ð13Þ
With plausible conditions on c(:) and W(xiat,xibt), there is a unique
solution (f ,r) to a~maxff ,rga(f ,r). Because r is subject to a
nonlinear constraint that depends on f , explicit expressions for
(f ,r) are not as simple as the no-intelligence case (see Text S1
for details). However, the structure of the solution is qualitatively
identical and intuitive: f  reduces to three possibilities, either 0 or
1 if correlation is too ‘‘expensive’’ to achieve, or the probability-
matching solution f ~Prob(xawxb) if the cost function c(r) is
not too extreme. This growth-optimal solution is an example of
bounded rationality–bounded in the sense that higher levels of r
might be achievable but at too high a cost c(r). The behavior that
eventually dominates the population is good enough, where ‘‘good
enough’’ now has a precise meaning: they attain the maximum
growth rate a. In other words, f  is an example of satisficing.
If the cost of intelligence is influenced by other biological and
environmental factors z~½z1    zn, then the multivariate cost
function c(r,z) will almost certainly induce a multiplicity of
solutions to the growth-optimization problem. This implies a
multitude of behaviors and levels of intelligence that can coexist
because they yield the same maximum population growth rate a.
The set of behaviors f (z) and intelligence r(z) that emerge from
the population will be a function of z and given implicitly by the
solution to a~maxff ,rga(f ,r). This provides a direct link
between adaptive behavior and the environment, which is the
basis for models of social evolution and evolutionary psychology
[27,29,61,62].
Discussion
The simplicity and generality of our framework suggest that the
behaviors we have derived are likely to be quite primitive on an
evolutionary timescale, and that most species will have developed
the necessarily biological apparatus to engage in such behavior
under the right environmental conditions.
However, evolution can also produce more sophisticated
behaviors such as overconfidence [63], altruism and self-deception
[61], and state-dependent strategies like the Hawk-Dove game
[64], which emerge as a result of more complex environmental
conditions. For example, if we assume that one individual’s action
can affect the reproductive success of another individual, e.g., i’s
fecundity is influenced by j’s selection of a or b, individuals
engaging in strategic behavior will reproduce more quickly than
those with simpler behaviors such as probability matching or loss
aversion. If the actions of individuals in the current generation can
affect the reproductive success of individuals in future generations,
even more complex dynamics are likely to emerge as in the well-
known overlapping generations model [65]. In a resource-
constrained environment in which one individual’s choice can
affect another individual’s reproductive success, strategic interac-
tions such as reciprocity and cooperation will likely emerge within
and across generations [28,31]. Other extensions of the binary-
choice framework include time varying environmental conditions
Wt(:,:), mutation through sexual reproduction, and multiple
reproductive cycles within a single lifetime (iteroparity). Each of
these extensions captures more realistic aspects of human behavior
and taken together, they may provide aggregate measures of
systemic risk and financial crisis [66].
In this paper, we have purposefully assumed a much simpler
structure, including an unconstrained stable stochastic environ-
ment with no strategic considerations, so as to determine what
types of behavior are truly primitive. Even in such a simple setting,
we find a surprisingly complex and subtle range of behaviors–
behaviors that do not always conform to common economic
intuition about rationality–can arise and persist via natural
selection. Simon [67] illustrated this principle vividly with the
example of a single ant traversing a mixed terrain of sand, rocks,
and grass. The ant’s path seems highly complex, but the
complexity may be due more to the environment than the ant’s
navigational algorithm.
This perspective has received more recent support from the
discovery of remarkably sophisticated social behavior among
bacteria [68–76]. There is little doubt that an individual bacterium
is mindless, yet colonies of such bacteria engage in seemingly
intelligent behavior such as competition, collaborative foraging,
and cell-to-cell chemotactic and physical communication. Such
behavior can ultimately be traced to genetic structures [66], but
the complementary approach of linking behavior directly to
reproductive outcomes may yield additional insights into the
common evolutionary origins of certain behaviors.
While it is nearly self-evident that the critical determinant of
which behavior emerges from a given population is the interaction
between the biological features of the individuals and the nature of
the environment, our simple framework shows just how powerful
environmental forces can be in shaping fundamental aspects of
decisionmaking. If we seek to understand the origin of intelligence
and the limits of rational behavior, we may find useful answers by
studying current and past environments in addition to studying
our genes.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Values of c and c{c(c) as functions of k, the cost
of intelligence parameter in equation (26) of Text S1.
(EPS)
Figure S2 Values of f  for particular values of k and
r~dz=(mb{ma). The region toward the upper left corresponds
to relatively costly intelligence and deterministic behavior of the
form f ~0. The region toward the lower right corresponds to
relatively cheap intelligence and probability matching of the form
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